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A. Introduction 
 “As more people capture special moments on video, YouTube is empowering them to 
become the broadcasters of tomorrow.”1 This self-glorying quote may have seemed far fetched 
less than a year ago, but of late, YouTube has been discussed as a potential “sixth network,”2
rivaling traditional distributors of video content that have had a stranglehold over audiences for 
decades. In some instances, it has even been shown that YouTube has already eclipsed television 
as the preferred arena for audiences. Connie Chung’s “Thanks for the Memories” episode was 
seen by twice as many viewers on YouTube after its initial broadcast.3 This is potentially a 
frightening scenario for both content creators and traditional content distributors, as their markets 
for both selling and providing exclusive avenues for consumption may be deteriorating. 
 It is fairly predictable that YouTube has already been the center of much attention for 
possible lawsuits. These discussions intensified after Google’s acquisition of the company for 
stock valued at $1.65 billion in October of 2006.4 This resolved one of the major issues that 
confronted content providers: was a company like YouTube worth suing? Without the deep 
pockets provided by a company like Google, copyright holders would not have had the proper 
incentives to either sue the users of YouTube or the hosting service. Damages would have been 
limited and possible injunctions against individual users posting clips would be costly with little 
benefit. This is primarily due to the nature of a posting service like YouTube, which was aptly 
 
* UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, CA. J.D. expected May, 2007. 
1 About YouTube, at http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
2 See Gary Arlen, ‘GooTube’ Impact on TV Unclear, TV Technology News (Nov. 1, 2006), at 
http://www.tvtechnology.com/pages/s.0082/t.451.html.  
3 YouTube Popularity Eclipses, and Influences, Fall TV Season, FoxNews.com (Aug. 18, 2006), at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,209022,00.html. 
4 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeremy W. Peters, Google to Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion, The New York Times 
(Oct. 9, 2006). 
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described in the first lawsuit against YouTube: “‘The scope of the infringements is akin to a 
murky moving target ... Videos uploaded are not identified by copyright owner or registration 
number but rather by the uploader's idiosyncratic choice of descriptive terms to describe the 
content of the video -- tags -- making it extremely impractical to identify plaintiff's copyrighted 
works.’"5
The final difficulty for those wishing to sue a video web hosting service like YouTube is 
its strict adherence to both prevailing case law and a statutory safe harbor that was not available 
to the likes of Grokster, Napster and Aimster. Although it is arguable that YouTube was built on 
the coat-tails of posted videos protected by copyright that would be deemed infringing, users also 
posted a significant amount of content that would be considered legitimate. In its infancy, 
legitimate content was predominately comprised of “user-created content.” This concept of 
legitimacy has been expanded as many content providers see service providers like YouTube as 
an avenue for growth. In August of 2006, YouTube unveiled a new advertising concept that will 
allow content providers to utilize YouTube as both an advertising platform and a revenue stream. 
A portion of the advertising sponsorships associated with pages featuring copyrighted content 
will be shared with the copyright holder of the video, in addition to YouTube setting up “brand 
channels” sponsored by the company. Some of the many companies forging deals with YouTube 
include CBS, NBC, TVT, Epic Records, Atlantic Records, E! Entertainment, MTV2, and Fox 
Searchlight.6 Music companies, like Sony BMG Entertainment, have even agreed to allow users 
to include copyrighted songs in their user created uploads.7
5 Mack Reed, Publishers vs. YouTube: Does either side win?, USC Annenberg Online Journalism Review (posted 
7/20/06) (quoting complaint of Robert Tur v. YouTube, case number CV 06-4436-GAF (FMOx), filed July 14, 2006 
in United States District Court, Central District of California) 
6 Fred von Lohmann, You Tube’s Balancing Act: Making Money, Not Enemies, The Hollywood Reporter, Esq. (July 
10, 2006), available at 
http://www.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=YouTube%27s+Balancing+Act%3A+Making+Money
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These arrangements can be very lucrative for content providers, as CBS has discovered 
about one month after signing a deal with YouTube to create a brand channel. YouTube 
estimated that CBS content has been viewed nearly 30 million times in the past month alone, but 
this represents only a portion of the total benefit to CBS. Although the causation is questionable, 
since posting clips of the shows on YouTube, the “Late Show with David Letterman” and “The 
Late Late Show with Craig Ferguson” have seen increases in new broadcast viewership by 5% 
and 7%, respectively.8 Statistics such as these also tend to legitimize YouTube, as three of the 
top 25 most viewed videos for November were CBS clips that were uploaded legally.9
More importantly for video hosting services, an additional defense could insulate them 
from the fate of a service like Grokster if they adhere to the safe harbor’s standards. The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) “‘was enacted to preserve copyright enforcement on the 
Internet and to provide immunity to service providers from copyright infringement liability’ for 
‘passive,’ ‘automatic’ actions in which a service provider’s system engages through a 
technological process initiated by another without the knowledge of the service provider.”10 With 
this policy goal in mind, four safe harbors were passed,11 one of which is applicable to 
YouTube’s defense against a potential lawsuit. Section 512(c) provides insulation from liability 
for monetary relief for those that store infringing content at the direction of a user.12 Whether 




7 Song BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License Agreement with YouTube (Oct. 9, 2006), at 
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=2cwCau7cKsA. 
8 After One Month, CBS Content Among Most Viewed Videos on YouTube, (Nov. 21, 2006), at 
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=oJpEXVevcKg. 
9 Id.
10 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2004), quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-
796, at 72 (1998). 
11 17 U.S.C.A. § 512. § 512 (a) – (d) provide for the four safe harbors, while § 512 (e) – (n) are applicable to each of 
the safe harbors.  
12 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1). 
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focus of this paper. I opine that YouTube has established the necessary policies and business 
practices to avail itself of this safe harbor.  
Despite my opinion as such, YouTube and some content providers do not necessarily 
believe that this affirmative defense is available to video web hosting services.13 Rather than rely 
on §512(c) exclusively, YouTube deemed it necessary to obtain agreements with content 
providers that eventually could have been plaintiffs in copyright infringement lawsuits, severely 
limiting their exposure. At least five lawsuits have already been filed against video web hosting 
services, one of which is against YouTube.14 There are many reasons beyond legal liability that 
deals with content providers may have been explored, including the company’s desire to be 
acquired by the likes of Google. At the very least, the strategic decision to share advertising 
revenues and the upcoming court cases call to question whether these business models are 
legitimate and warrant the investor attention they have received. 
This paper will begin with a brief introduction to the service that YouTube provides, as 
well as explanations for its amazing growth after its official launch in December of 2005. 
Second, I will discuss the DMCA safe harbor found in §512(c) and how it has been interpreted 
by the courts since its adoption in 1998. Within this section, I will focus on case law that is 
applicable to YouTube’s potential liability, as well as how related case law (especially in the 
realm of vicarious liability) may ultimately influence such a decision. Next, I will briefly discuss 
 
13 For an interesting discussion of Mark Cuban’s heated opinion on YouTube’s viability over the long term, see 
YouTube is “toast,” Biztech (Sept. 29, 2006), at http://www.smh.com.au/news/biztech/youtube-is-
toast/2006/09/30/1159337344017.html. 
14 A complaint has been filed against YouTube. Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 2006 WL 3043777 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
YouTube’s answer has also been filed. Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 2006 WL 3043780 (C.D. Cal. 2006). Universal Music 
has also sued three companies for infringement, including Myspace, Grouper Network and Bolt. UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. Mypsace, Inc., 2006 WL 3466446 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Universal hits MySpace with copyright suit,
CNNMoney.com (Nov. 17, 2006), at 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/17/technology/universal_myspace.reut/index.htm?postversion; Sony: Grouper did 
not break copyright law, CNNMoney.com (Nov. 22, 2006), at 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/22/technology/sony_grouper.reut/index.htm. Finally, Veoh Networks is being sued 
by the IO Group. Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 2006 WL 2180442 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
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how YouTube may fair under the concepts of direct and secondary infringement liability, 
obviating the necessity of the §512(c) safe harbor. Finally, I will discuss the policy implications 
that such decisions could result in. 
 
B. YouTube: How It Works and How It Grew 
1. You Post, We Host 
YouTube, started as a personal video sharing service, has become a worldwide 
entertainment destination. One reason for its meteoric growth is the website’s ease of use. After 
the user uploads and “tags”15 a video, the video hosting service encodes it, supplies a player, and 
provides bandwidth and server space at no charge to the user. Once the video is posted, a URL is 
provided which can be passed on to other users. These users can then browse the hosting service 
for additional content. New users can also post their own content (as well as embed posted 
videos onto other websites) and a library eventually is built on the hosting service. At this point, 
the hosting service is merely “technology and infrastructure.”16 
It has been argued that the reason for YouTube’s dominance over Google Video stemmed 
from Google’s inability to move beyond the technological service, whereas YouTube became a 
“destination and a brand.”17 This can be accomplished by the browsing experience and an 
engaging and inviting front page.18 When the brand becomes associated with the content, the 
aggregator becomes as important as the content and an audience is built, which can also lead to 
 
15 User provides “tags” that become associated with the uploaded video. They can describe the genre of the video, 
the person appearing in the video, or any other term that would easily identify the video. These terms are not 
standardized, as they are left to the idiosyncrasies of the user. Therefore, a duplicate video may have different tag 
associations. Tags are useful when users are browsing the site or when searching for videos. 
16 How YouTube Works, On Demand Media, at ondemandmedia.typepad.com/odm/2006/10/how_youtubs.wor.html 
(last visited 10/30/06) 
17 Id.
18 Id.
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social networking opportunities for users.19 From there, network effects take over: more users 
lead to more content, which then leads to more users.20 This self-perpetuating loop leads to 
supremacy and the potential for monopoly-type power. The download, user and library statistics 
have already begun to show YouTube’s dominance over its more than 100 competitors in the 
free, Web-based video hosting service Internet business.21 Sources vary in their reporting of use 
statistics, but Nielsen NetRatings has estimated that as of July, 2006, YouTube users streamed 50 
million videos per day to more 12.5 million people each month.22 
YouTube’s content is as varied as its users, which is reflected by the breadth of video that 
can be found. There are some limits on what content is acceptable for posting. Unlawful, 
obscene, pornographic or racist content is impermissible, as well as material that is copyrighted, 
protected by trade secrets or otherwise subject to third-party proprietary rights without 
permission of the rightful owner.23 In addition, YouTube has implemented a time restriction of 
10-minute per video. One commentator stated “YouTube’s 10-minute clip limit and tiny video 
 
19 Id.
20 From May to July, the number of videos uploaded daily on YouTube increased from 50,000 to 65,000. YouTube - 
Serving 100 Million Videos a Day, Myspace Gaining Ground (July 16, 2006), at 
http://blog.experiencecurve.com/archives/youtube-serving-100-million-videos-a-day. 
21 von Lohmann, supra note 6. 
22 Id. YouTube currently claims more than 70 million videos watched daily. About YouTube, supra note 1. 
According to other reports, this could be up to 100 million videos daily.  YouTube - Serving 100 Million Videos a 
Day, Myspace Gaining Ground, supra note 20. From December, 2005 to October, 2006, YouTube has estimated the 
number of unique users has grown from 3 to 6 million. Jonathan A. Hyman, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and 
Love YouTube, at http://www.kmob.com/pdf/videohosting_youtube.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). In July of 2006, 
according to Hitwise, it was estimated that YouTube held 29% of the U.S. multimedia entertainment market. 
Myspace was the only company close to YouTube (19%), while Yahoo, MSN, Google and AOL (3-5% each) trailed 
behind. Id. Again, according to Hitwise, YouTube was estimated to have a 43% market share of video search sites in 
May of 2006, which MySpace Video (24%), Yahoo! Video Search (10%), MSN Video Search (9%), and Google 
Video Search (6%) could not match. Hitwise, Hitwise Data Shows Overall Visits to Video Search Sites Up 164%,
Hitwise (May 24, 2006), at http://www.hitwise.com/press-center/hitwiseHS2004/videosearch.php. 
23 The exact limitations, as found in YouTube’s Terms of Use, User Submissions: users will not “(i) submit material 
that is copyrighted, protected by trade secret or otherwise subject to third party proprietary rights, including privacy 
and publicity rights, unless you are the owner of such rights or have permission from their rightful owner to post the 
material and to grant YouTube all of the license rights granted herein; (ii) publish falsehoods or misrepresentations 
that could damage YouTube or any third party; (iii) submit material that is unlawful, obscene, defamatory, libelous, 
threatening, pornographic, harassing, hateful, racially or ethnically offensive, or encourages conduct that would be 
considered a criminal offense, give rise to civil liability, violate any law, or is otherwise inappropriate; (iv) post 
advertisements or solicitations of business: (v) impersonate another person.” Terms of Service, at 
http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
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window cater to clip culture, not pirates,” as neither television programming nor movies would 
fall under this limitation.24 This distinguishes YouTube from services that swap entire television 
shows and movies.  
What can be found on YouTube includes more traditional media content, like TV clips 
and music videos. However, the website also hosts a large amount of user-created content, 
including animations, amateur lip-synched songs, Hollywood trailer mash-ups and other remixed 
material, family videos and seemingly anything that can be recorded using a camcorder. 
Importantly, what ends up on YouTube is user dependant, as YouTube uploads videos from 
users without screening prior to posting.25 The homepage includes ten daily “featured videos,”26 
as well as one sponsored video. 
2. Terms of Use and Copyright Info27 
The User Submissions section of the “Terms of Use” implicates the copyright issues 
discussed later in this paper, so a brief description of the pertinent clauses will inform that 
examination. A user is solely responsible for any User Submission posted and affirms that they 
own or have the necessary rights to use and authorize YouTube to use content that may be 
protected by any proprietary rights. All ownership remains with the user submitting the video, 
but the user grants YouTube a “non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable 
license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform User 
Submissions in connection with the YouTube Website and YouTube’s business.”28 Additionally, 
 
24 von Lohmann, supra note 6. 
25 Hyman, supra note 22. 
26 The selection process is not described by YouTube, nor is the information behind the selection process available 
as far as I can tell. When asked to describe their metric, I received an e-mail response, unhelpfully stating “Thank 
you for your interest in YouTube, but unfortunately we are unable to help you with the information you need. The 
YouTube Team” (e-mail response, received Dec. 12, 2006, from copyright@youtube.com). 
27 Copies of the Terms of Use and Copyright Info can be found at http://www.youtube.com/t/terms and 
http://www.youtube.com/t/dmca_policy, respectively. 
28 Section 5(B), Terms of Service, supra note 23. 
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YouTube will remove any content that infringes copyright or does not comply with the terms, 
after proper notification29 of infringement is provided or at their discretion, without prior notice 
to the user and at their sole discretion.30 If a User Submission is removed from YouTube, the 
user can elect to send a counter notice.31 Finally, the company details their repeat infringer 
policy: “YouTube will also terminate a User's access to its Website, if they are determined to be 
a repeat infringer. A repeat infringer is a User who has been notified of infringing activity more 
than twice and/or has had a User Submission removed from the Website more than twice.”32 
3. The Development of the YouTube Business Model 
Statistics in April, 2006 estimated that YouTube’s bandwidth costs alone were upwards 
of $1 million per month.33 Since YouTube is a free service to both its users and uploaders, this is 
a hefty bill to sustain. Advertising dollars could help YouTube become profitable, if the 
company is not already.34 This business model is similar to that exploited by broadcast television 
networks: content is “free,” but the consumer “pays” by having to watch advertising. Reports 
indicate that as late as July, YouTube was conservative in its advertising sales, adding ads 
 
29 Section 5(D), Terms of Service provides elements of proper notification (can also be found in Copyright Info,
supra note 27). The elements needed for proper notification follow the requirements provided in 17 U.S.C.A. 
512(c)(3) and provides a designated Copyright Agent. Content holders have used this policy to remove their 
copyrighted materials from YouTube. For example, NBC owned “Saturday Night Live” skits and an American 
Airlines in-house training video have both been removed after a proper notification was received by YouTube. 
Hyman, supra note 22. 
30 “YouTube does not permit copyright infringing activities and infringement of intellectual property rights on its 
Website, and YouTube will remove all Content and User Submissions if properly notified that such Content or User 
Submission infringes on another's intellectual property rights. YouTube reserves the right to remove Content and 
User Submissions without prior notice…YouTube also reserves the right to decide whether Content or a User 
Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for violations other than copyright infringement 
and violations of intellectual property law, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or defamatory material, 
or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a User's access for uploading 
such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior notice and at its sole discretion.” 
Section 5(C), Terms of Service, supra note 23. 
31 Copyright Info, supra note 27. 
32 Section 5(C), Terms of Service, supra note 23. 
33 Dan Frommer, Your Tube, Whose Dime?, Forbes.com (Apr. 8, 2006), at 
http://www.forbes.com/intelligentinfrastructure/2006/04/27/video-youtube-myspace_cx_df_0428video.html. 
34 For an interesting discussion on YouTube’s profitability, see Mitch Ratcliffe, YouTube wildly profitable? (Oct. 4, 
2006), at http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ratcliffe/?p=186. 
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exclusively to search result pages.35 Following the Google acquisition, this approach has been 
amended. Banner advertising is now included on most clip pages, as are video advertisements on 
the homepage.36 
The change in advertising strategy may have also been the result of the deals YouTube 
has negotiated with many of the largest content providers, from sports leagues like the NHL,37 to 
music companies like Song BMG and Universal Music,38 to network television stations like 
CBS,39 to production companies like Lucasfilm.40 For example, YouTube’s deal with Warner 
Music signed in September, 2006 allows Warner Music to use YouTube as a platform for 
distributing music videos, while sharing in the ad revenue for the pages hosting Warner Music 
content.41 In addition, brand channels have been created pursuant to these deals under the 
“Channels–Partners” link.42 
In September of 2006, YouTube also announced a plan to create technology to combat 
the appearance of unlicensed content on its service. The above mentioned music deals embrace 
this technology, which is designed “to automatically spot copyrighted material that users upload 
without the permission of media companies, and then…share ad revenue with those 
companies.”43 This technology apparently will be able to flag content like music videos, as well 
 
35 von Lohmann, supra note 6. 
36 Kevin J. Delaney & Ethan Smith, YouTube Model is Compromise Over Copyrights, Wall Street Journal (Sept. 19, 
2006), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115862128600366836-
75c3bUMscxrCANO6O7hKTgLNTTc_20070919.html. 
37 See YouTube and National Hockey League Team Up For Strategic Content and Advertising Partnership (Nov. 15. 
2006), at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=2oJxBs3sq3k. 
38 See Sony BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License Agreement with YouTube (Oct. 9, 2006), at 
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=2cwCau7cKsA and Universal Music Group and YouTube Forge 
Strategic Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=JrYdNx45e-0. 
39 See CBS and YouTube Strike Strategic Content and Advertising Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), at 
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=iXG7e1g-BWI. 
40 Hyman, supra note 22. 
41 Delaney, supra note 36. 
42 For an example, see http://www.youtube.com/members?s=pa&t=w&g=-1. 
43 Delaney, supra note 36. 
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as user created videos making use of copyrighted songs.44 The audio identification system is 
hoped to be used to locate unauthorized non-music content as well. Such technology would help 
lower copyright holders’ responsibility of tracking down unlicensed content on YouTube. 
 
C. Is YouTube Safe Under §512(c)? 
 So what does this all mean for YouTube, or one of its competitors? As unlicensed, 
copyrighted material appears on the website, YouTube is open to lawsuits for copyright 
infringement. Content providers like Universal Music seem to believe, absent a licensing deal, a 
video hosting service on the Internet would be liable for infringement, as the company has 
proceeded with a lawsuit against Bolt and Grouper Network (which is now owned by Sony 
Pictures Entertainment). Grouper defended its actions, stating that the service complies with the 
DMCA.45 Whether a video hosting service would survive such a lawsuit will be discussed in this 
section, utilizing YouTube as a case example.  
The safe harbor does not affect the company’s liability under the different theories of 
infringement, but limits the relief available. Finding safe haven under §512(c) would shield 
YouTube from monetary liability or equitable relief, except as detailed in §512(j), for infringing 
activities on its website.46 Based on the policy to prevent copyright infringement liability for 
passive, automatic actions by a service provider and the surrounding case law, I believe 
 
44 “The system relies partly on what’s known as ‘fingerprinting’ – comparing audio uploaded to the site to unique 
attributes of copyrighted content it already knows.” Id. Video-identification technology is also hoped to be used 
eventually. Id.
45 Sony: Grouper did not break copyright law, CNNMoney.com (Nov. 22, 2006), at 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/22/technology/sony_grouper.reut/index.htm. 
46 17 U.S.C.A § 512(c)(1). If an injunction is permissible under section 512, it is only for the limited context 
described under § 512(j)(1). When deciding to grant injunctive relief, the court must consider, among other factors, 
whether the injunction would “significantly burden either the provider or the operation of the provider’s system or 
network” and whether “implementation of such an injunction would be technically feasible and effective, and would 
not interfere with access to noninfringing material at other online locations.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(j)(A)&(C). Shutting 
down YouTube completely would obviously violate these provisions. 
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YouTube would fall under this non-exclusive affirmative defense. The cases discussed are 
representative of the different approaches courts have applied to this DMCA provision. The 
requirements that will be at the center of finding YouTube eligible are as follows: (1) does 
YouTube have an appropriate repeat infringer policy and comply with standard technological 
measures? (§512(i)); (2) is YouTube a service provider? (§512(k)(1)(B)); (3) does YouTube 
have actual knowledge or is it aware of facts and circumstances of infringing activities on its 
website? (§512(c)(1)(A)); (4) does YouTube receive a financial benefit directly attributable to 
the infringing activity and the right and ability to control such activity? (§512(c)(1)(B)); and (5) 
does YouTube have a sufficient notice and takedown system? (§512(c)(1)(C)). 
 1. Accommodation of Technology  
 “Nothing in [Section 512] shall be construed to condition the applicability of [subsection 
(c)] on…a service provider monitoring its services or affirmatively seeking facts indicating 
infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying 
with the provisions of subsection (i).”47 This concept was further explained in the House Report, 
where it states that a service provider need not “investigate possible infringements, monitor its 
service, or make difficult judgments as to whether conduct is or is not infringing.”48 However, 
there are certain affirmative requirements that the hosting service must adhere to as a condition 
for eligibility.49 
a. Repeat Infringer Policy 
 Section 512(i)(1)(A) creates three service provider requirements, as interpreted by the 
Ellison50 court: “(1) adopt a policy that provides for the termination of service access for repeat 
 
47 17 U.S.C.A. §512(m)(1).  
48 H.R. Rep. 105-551(II) at 61 (1998). 
49 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc, 213 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
50 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004), emphasis added. 
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copyright infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2) implement that policy in a reasonable 
manner; and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy.”51 Part (3) of the test is easily resolved for 
YouTube, since a repeat infringer policy is included as a part of its Terms of Service.52 All that is 
required is that users be put on notice that repeated infringements will lead to termination of 
access from all services.53 
The remainder of this test presents difficult, fact dependant questions, not easily decided 
as a matter of law.54 The case law makes clear that the adopted policy must eliminate the 
infringer and not merely the infringing content.55 As evidenced by the Corbis56 case, the level of 
detail needed to adopt such a policy is not great. The Participation Agreement in this case was 
held adequate despite its failure to define “repeat infringer,” arguably not indicating when 
appropriate circumstances for termination existed. It was sufficient that users knew there was a 
threat of losing access to the service if they infringed intellectual property rights, agreed to the 
Participation Agreement, and were disciplined under the Participation Agreement for 
violations.57 
What are appropriate circumstances for termination is the subject of some debate. The 
Cybernet58 court appears to take a stricter look into what “appropriate circumstances” and 
“reasonably implemented” mean, whereas the Corbis, Ellison and CCBill59 courts appear to 
conflate the issues into one. The Cybernet court implies that a “notice and take-down” provision 
like that in Corbis, on its own, may not meet the reasonable implementation requirement when 
 
51 Id. at 1080. 
52 See Section B.2 above. 
53 Corbis Corporation v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1102  (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
54 Ellison, supra note 49, at 1078. 
55 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp.2d 1077, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
56 Corbis, supra note 53. 
57 Id. at 1101. 
58 Cybernet, supra note 49. 
59 CCBill, supra note 55. 
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ignorance of infringement would result in the services becoming “safe havens or conduits for 
known repeat copyright infringers.”60 Although they did not hold on this prong when rejecting 
the summary judgment motion filed by the defendant, Cybernet, the court stated that there was a 
strong likelihood Cybernet did not meet its obligation. A point that appeared important to the 
court was that the known infringer be terminated from its services completely, not merely from 
certain services.61 
Under the lesser Corbis standard, it appears that YouTube would have met its 
requirement. Their repeat infringer policy even provides for the appropriate circumstances for 
which a user would be terminated. However, under the arguably stricter Cybernet standard, 
YouTube may run afoul of being able to prevent repeat infringers from returning to the service. 
As one commentator points out, the policy is fairly easy to circumvent due to the anonymity in 
the posting process.62 It can be argued that YouTube could become a “safe haven” for infringers, 
since users can create a new identity if their account is terminated. This fear, although legitimate, 
may not create a major issue for YouTube if the court chooses to focus on YouTube’s efforts to 
curb infringement on its website. The company has clearly taken steps to prevent infringement 
through deals with content providers and their commitment to technologies to flag copyrighted 
content. Therefore, it would be hard to argue that they were turning a blind eye to the problem or 
creating a pirate-friendly website. This policy argument may not be persuasive, as YouTube’s 
failure to eliminate infringers, rather than infringing material, is the purpose behind this 
requirement. 
 b. Standard Technical Measures 
 
60 Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1177-78. “These circumstances would appear to cover, at a minimum, instances where 
a service provider is given sufficient evidence to create actual knowledge of blatant, repeat infringement by 
particular users, particularly infringement of a willful and commercial nature.” Id. at 1177. 
61 Id. at 1179. 
62 Hyman, supra note 22. 
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The second inquiry under §512(i)(1) requires the service provider “accommodates and 
does not interfere with standard technical measures.”63 Standard technical measures is defined in 
§512(i)(2).64 It would be difficult to argue that YouTube violates this requirement, as technical 
measures do not exist at this time that allow copyright owners to identify and protect copyrighted 
works in videos. YouTube could require watermarking by the copyright holder for videos to be 
uploaded, but this would prevent user created content from appearing on the website. YouTube is 
also taking affirmative steps, as discussed previously, to combat this problem. Until there is a 
broad consensus of copyright owners who agree on such a standard, video hosting services are 
likely accommodating standard technical measures. 
 2. Service Provider 
 The §512(c) safe harbor only applies to service providers, defined in §512(k)(1)(B) as “a 
provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”65 Under the 
standard definition, many websites may not be considered service provides,66 but under the 
judicially interpreted, statutory definition, courts “have trouble imagining the existence of an 
online service that would not fall under the definitions.”67 
In Hendrickson68, this definition was interpreted very broadly, but the court failed to 
qualify why eBay fell under the statute’s definition.69 The Corbis court provided more insight, 
 
63 17 U.S.C.A § 512(i)(1)(B). 
64 “Definition.--As used in this subsection, the term "standard technical measures" means technical measures that are 
used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works and --(A) have been developed pursuant to a 
broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards 
process; (B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose 
substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks.” 17 U.S.C.A § 512(i)(2). 
65 17 U.S.C.A § 512(k)(1)(B) 
66 The plaintiffs in Aimster provide the commonplace definition: “internet service providers ‘generally provide a 
way to connect to the Internet (e.g., phone or cable modem) as well as a mechanism that tells a computer how and 
where to access information on the Internet.’” In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252F.Supp.2d 634, 658 (N.D. Ill. 
2002).  
67 Id. Aimster was found to be a service provider. 
68 Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
69 Id. at 1088. 
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holding that Amazon was a service provider, as it “operates web sites, provides retail and third 
party selling services to Internet users, and maintains computers to govern access to its web 
sites.”70 Further clarity into the breadth of the term “service provider” was offered by the 
Cybernet court. In rejecting Perfect 10’s more limited definition, which would exclude services 
that had an interest in the content or participated in screening or selecting the data,71 the court 
made it abundantly clear that almost all websites would fall under this expansive definition, 
including YouTube. 
 3. Knowledge: Actual or Apparent 
 The safe harbor is not intended to insulate those service providers who have actual or 
apparent knowledge of infringing activity. The three prongs dealing with infringement awareness 
have been interpreted very narrowly and favorably for service providers, which leads me to 
conclude that YouTube will likely satisfy this requirement. 
 a. Actual Knowledge 
 There are two primary methods a content provider can us to establish a service provider’s 
actual awareness under §512(c)(1)(A)(i). The first and more practical method is to supply 
evidence that notification was provided of the infringing material. By substantially complying 
with the DMCA’s notice requirement,72 actual infringement would be established.73 Failure by 
the content holder to provide notice of infringement requires that there be knowledge beyond “a 
general awareness that a particular type of item may be easily infringed.”74 Very little guidance 
 
70 Corbis, supra note 53, at 1100. 
71 Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1175. 
72 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(B). This requirement will be discussed in Section C.5 of this paper. The service provider 
can challenge that that the notice substantially complied with the requirements. 
73 Corbis, supra note 53, at 1107. 
74 Id. at 1108. 
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is provided by the courts as to the extent of the evidence needed,75 but an extreme onus can be 
inferred by the high threshold required for apparent knowledge. As there is no affirmative duty to 
search for infringing content, however, it appears that absent notification, establishing an 
instance of actual knowledge of infringement would be almost impossible. 
 b. Apparent Knowledge 
 If actual knowledge is not established, the copyright holder has to demonstrate that the 
service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.”76 Awareness does not hinge on whether a reasonable person would have inferred that 
infringement was occurring,77 but whether a service provider “turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of 
obvious infringement.”78 As interpreted by the Corbis court, to demonstrate apparent knowledge, 
the copyright holder must show that their material was being hosted on a website that was 
“clearly a pirate site.”79 One is clearly a pirate site if the URL and header information uses terms 
that show the purpose is illegal, like pirate or bootleg, even when the viewing is “brief and 
casual.”80 
In Corbis, the court held that Corbis did not adequately establish that the defendant 
Amazon had anything more than general knowledge of infringement, and did not ignore red flags 
that would have led to awareness.81 Third party notices were not held to constitute red flags, 
absent other evidence. Moreover, no evidence on the actual websites was found to be an 
 
75 Where no notice was provided of infringement of photos, actual knowledge was not established when the plaintiff, 
Corbis, supplied evidence of third party notices regarding non-Corbis photos or evidence of awareness by the 
defendant, Amazon, that Corbis licensed photos. Id. at 1107. 
76 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
77 3 Nimmer on Copyright, §12B.04[A][1], at 12B-49. 
78 H.R.Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 42. 
79 Corbis, supra note 53, at 1108. 
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1109. There was nothing blatant on the vendor listings that would have led to a suggestion that the websites 
contained copyrighted material. Amazon meeting with representatives of Corbis to provide general knowledge that 
infringing photos may appear on zShop sites was also not enough to prove that Amazon had apparent knowledge. Id.
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indicator of obvious infringement. Finally, they held that general familiarity of Corbis’ business 
was not enough to put them on notice of infringement.82 Other courts looking at the issue of 
apparent knowledge have held that defective notices do not act as red flags;83 nor were 
disclaimers on a website stating that any copyrighted images found were either in the public 
domain or posted for a newsworthy purpose.84 
Whether YouTube ignores red flags is unclear, based on some cursory searches 
performed in early December, 2006. Typing "pirate" into the search engine yields results ranging 
from videos discussing the legal ramifications of pirating music, to videos that, oddly enough are 
based on a pirate theme. “Illegal” generates information regarding illegal activities, or live 
performances of Shakira performing her song, “Illegal” (ironic, I know). “Bootleg” is probably 
the most damaging to YouTube, as the search results provide videos of soccer, concerts or 
television interviews, all of which likely appear illegally. The service provider may not be 
required to perform these searches, based on the lack of a duty to discover infringing material. 
How a court would interpret what appears to be a conflict between the absence of an affirmative 
obligation to investigate and the requirement that the service provider not ignore red flags is 
unclear. However, the strictness of the courts’ interpretation of this prong leads me to believe 
that YouTube would not have apparent knowledge. 
 c. Expeditious Removal 
 The final condition under §512(c)(1)(A) requires the service provider “upon obtaining 
such knowledge or awareness” to act “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material.”85 Accordingly, YouTube promptly removes the infringing material once it is properly 
 
82 Id. at 1108-9. 
83 Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1093. 
84 CCBill, supra note 55, at 1098. 
85 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) 
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notified. They also reserve the right to unilaterally remove material they are aware is infringing, 
as expressed in the “Terms of Use.” Presumably, YouTube removes this material, and therefore 
meets this requirement. 
4. Financial Benefit, and Right and Ability to Control 
 This condition is likely to be the heart of a lawsuit against YouTube and their ability to 
utilize the §512(c) safe harbor. Based on the prevailing precedent, YouTube may be found to 
“directly benefit attributable to the infringing activity” and the “right and ability to control such 
activity.”86 This is primarily the result of courts conflating precedent from contributory and 
vicarious liability cases, which has led to inconsistent rulings. At least one court has explicitly 
rejected the importation of contributory liability theories for the financial benefit prong.87 As this 
issue would be integral to any ruling regarding YouTube, I will distinguish cases where other 
theories of liability influence the decision of the court. Ultimately, I believe the court will follow 
the CoStar II line of cases, rather than those that rely on Fonovisa88 and its progeny. 
 a. Direct Financial Benefit Attributable to the Infringing Activity 
 There are two primary precedents under this section of the safe harbor. The first, set by 
CoStar II, was ruled consistent by Cybernet, which falls into the vicarious infringement line of 
cases. CoStar II involves the posting of photographs by users to advertise property listings on the 
defendant LoopNet’s website, some of which were potentially infringing. No posting fee was 
required for any listing, regardless of the use of a photograph.89 The court held that there is no 
direct financial benefit attributable to the infringing activity “where the infringer makes the same 
 
86 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B) 
87 See CoStar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc. 164 F.Supp.2d 688, 705 (D.C. Maryland 2001) (“CoStar II”).  
88 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (Ninth Cir. 1996). 
89 CoStar II, supra note 87, at 692 
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kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s service.”90 Neither the infringers or the 
non-infringers paid anything for the service, so there was no direct financial benefit.91 
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there is a direct financial benefit 
attributable to the infringing activity for the purposes of §512(c) when “infringing performances 
enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers.”92 The court found that the 
application of this “indirect” benefit test, although applicable in a contributory infringement 
cause of action, was not warranted by the plain language or purpose of the statute. Since the 
financial benefit was required to be directly attributable, an indirect benefit test was deemed 
inapplicable.93 However, this indirect benefit test was applied in Fonovisa as a method of 
showing direct financial benefit from the customers in a vicarious infringement suit.94 This 
seems to imply that CoStar II was rejecting the use of vicarious liability precedent for this 
requirement of the safe harbor, as it was a vicarious liability test that was rejected. Whether this 
was their intent is unclear,95 but a question arises as to what case law relating to direct financial 
benefit should be applicable to the DMCA safe harbors. 
The Cybernet court held that “the direct flow of income to Cybernet based on the number 
of new Adult Check users that sign up to Adult Check from infringing sites establishes that direct 
relationship.”96 In this case, websites using the Adult Check97 service included infringing 
 
90 Id. at 705, quoting H.R.Rep. No. 105-551, Part 2, at 54. 
91 Id.
92 Fonovisa, supra note 88, at 263. 
93 CoStar II, supra note 87, at 705. The plaintiff attempted to use Playboy Ent. v. Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503 
(N.D. Oh. 1997), a contributory infringement cause of action, as controlling precedent. The test discussed from 
Hardenburgh relies on Fonovisa’s vicarious liability precedent. I believe Hardenburgh misapplied this precedent in 
a contributory negligence context. 
94 Fonovisa, supra note 88, at 263. 
95 Interestingly, at the same time, the court states that “the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious 
infringement because it codifies both elements of vicarious liability.” Id. at 704. The Cybernet court expressed “no 
opinion on the question whether ‘directly attributable’ language is narrower or equivalent to the general vicarious 
infringement requirements.” Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1181. 
96 Id.
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pictures. The webmasters who run and promote the websites under the Adult Check brand are 
not charged a fee for the service; rather the customer pays a monthly fee to Cybernet, who then 
distributes revenue to the webmasters based on which website was responsible for the 
enrollment.98 Perfect 10 found approximately 900 Adult Check affiliated websites99 housed more 
than 10,000 copies of Perfect 10 images.100 
The court looked at legislative history to derive the outcome. Courts should use a 
“common-sense, fact based approach, not a formalistic one.”101 Where the value of the service 
originates from the infringing content, rather than a “legitimate business,” the service provider 
receives a direct financial benefit.102 Since membership growth, and thus Cybernet’s revenue, 
was dependant on the quantity and quality of images available on Adult Check member websites 
(some of which were using infringing images to attract new members), a direct benefit was found 
to exist.103 
In coming to this conclusion, the court attempts to distinguish this case from CoStar II:
“[t]his is quite different from the situation in CoStar where the site made money on other 
services it offered, which were not directly tied to the infringing activity.”104 Implicit in this 
argument is that the infringement is enhancing the desirability of these sites, which leads to a 
disproportionate amount of funds from infringing sites. Otherwise, using the reasoning of CoStar 
II, since the webmasters are indirectly paying the same percentage fee per new customer 
regardless of their status as an infringer, they would not be directly benefiting from the 
 
97 Adult Check is an age verification service, which is designed to prevent minors from accessing online 
pornographic content. Id. at 1157-58. 
98 Id.
99 Adult Check has approximately 300,000 sites total. Id. at 1158. 
100 Id. at 1162. 
101 H.R.Rep. 105-551(II), at 54. 
102 Id.
103 Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1181. 
104 Id.
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infringement. The Cybernet court appears to be adopting a vicarious infringement standard for 
direct financial interest, like that used in Fonovisa. Similarly, Aimster held that the direct 
financial benefit element of §512(c)(1)(B) was met, and refers the reader to the section 
discussing vicarious liability.105 In Aimster, the “financial benefit element is…satisfied 
where…the existence of infringing activities act as a draw for potential customers.”106 The tests 
adopted in Fonovisa, Aimster and Cybernet appear to be the same test, and it is unclear that any 
of them are consistent with the precedent set in CoStar II. Whether all vicarious infringement 
precedents for this prong are applicable is ambiguous to say the least. 
One of particular importance to YouTube is the recently decided Google107 case, where 
under a vicarious infringement theory of liability, the defendant Google was found to receive a 
direct financial benefit. Applying the precedent of Fonovisa as applied broadly by the Napster108 
court, a direct financial benefit was established as Google’s revenue was directly dependent on 
an increase in their user-base. “Google certainly derives a direct financial benefit if users visit 
AdSense109 partners’ websites that contain such infringing photos” since they will share in the 
advertising revenue appearing on those sites.110 
This murky background creates many questions as to YouTube’s ability to rely on 
§512(c). “Some have argued that this may restrict the kinds of advertising business models that 
YouTube (and other video hosing services) might want to pursue, as ads tied too closely to an 
infringing video could be viewed as creating a ’financial benefit directly attributable to the 
 
105 Aimster, supra note 66, at 661. 
106 Id. at 655. 
107 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). For a more detailed description of this case’s 
vicarious liability precedent, please see Section D.2.a above. 
108 Napster, Inc. v. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). 
109 “‘To participate [in AdSense], a website publisher places code on its site that ask Google’s server to 
algorithmically select relevant advertisements’ based on the content of that site.” Google, supra note 107, at 834, 
quoting Def.’s MacGillivray Decl. ¶ 9. 
110 Google, supra note 107, at 857. 
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infringing activity.’”111 This may explain YouTube’s initial hesitance to place advertisements on 
content pages, as well as their rush to make deals with copyright holders. Following CoStar II’s 
precedent, it is unlikely that YouTube will be found to have received a direct financial benefit 
from displaying a banner ad on an infringing video’s website. As posters of video, including 
infringers, are not charged to do so, they appear to follow that precedent. The less formalistic 
approach of the Cybernet court may not find this to be persuasive. Moreover, if other vicarious 
liability doctrines are imported to §512(c), like that of Google, it appears that YouTube’s banner 
ads on infringing video pages would clearly confer a direct financial benefit. 
 b) Right and Ability to Control Activity 
 The case law is slightly more consistent for this section of the statutory safe harbor. 
Almost all of the courts recognize that the right and ability to control the infringing activity, “as 
the concept is used in the DMCA, cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to remove 
or block access to materials posted on its website or stored on its system.”112 Two cases 
explicitly import concepts from contributory and vicarious infringement jurisprudence,113 again 
generating doubt as to which precedents are applicable to this statutory condition. 
 The Hendrickson court argued that the purpose behind the DMCA necessitated the 
adoption of the above bright line rule. The DMCA requires that infringing materials be removed 
from the website, so to espouse that service providers would lose their insulation under §512(c) 
by adhering to the statute would be internally inconsistent. Additionally, the court held that the 
“voluntary practice of engaging in limited monitoring of [a service provider’s] website for 
 
111 von Lohmann, supra note 6. 
112 Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1093. 
113 Cybernet applies a concept borrowed from contributory infringement cases to hold that the company had a right 
and ability to control the infringing activity. Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1181-82. CoStar II seems to indicate that 
they are adopting a vicarious infringement standard: “LoopNet does not have the ‘right and ability’ to control its 
users commensurate with the standard for vicarious infringement.” CoStar II, supra note 87, at 704. Aimster again 
refers the reader to the section discussing vicarious liability in coming to its conclusion that this requirement is met. 
Aimster, supra note 66, at 661. 
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‘apparent’ infringements…cannot, in and of itself, lead the Court to conclude that [the service 
provider] has the right and ability to control infringing activity within the meaning of the 
DMCA.”114 eBay’s practice of searching its website daily, using terms like “bootleg” or 
“pirated,” to find and remove users that are selling infringing products was consistent with 
legislative history, stating that a service provider’s ability to use §512(c) should not be limited 
solely because of their use of a monitoring program.115 This rule also makes the statute internally 
consistent with what is required under the “red flag” standard for apparent knowledge.116 
The Cybernet court held that Cybernet had the right and ability to control the infringing 
activity. The court provides a list of activities Cybernet partook in that established this 
conclusion, which included prescreening sites,117 giving “extensive advice,” prohibiting 
“proliferation of identical sites,” among other things. These procedures meant they did 
“something more,” a concept borrowed from contributory liability of trademark licensors.118 It 
appears the court was concerned that Cybernet was too involved with the content, rather than 
merely operating a service for hosting the content. The Corbis court, applying Cybernet, held 
that Amazon did not have the right and ability to control: “Amazon does not preview the 
products prior to listing, does not edit the product descriptions, does not suggest prices, or 
otherwise involve itself in the sale.”119 
Aimster refers the reader to the vicarious liability section in its application of the DMCA. 
In doing so, the precedent set by this court is the one outlier where termination of individual 
 
114 Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1093. The court also stated that eBay did not have a right and ability to control the 
infringing activity, since the sales and distribution of the infringing material was consummated offline, and no 
infringing material was actually found on the website. eBay never had possession or the ability to inspect the 
material. Id. at 1094. YouTube, who hosts the infringing videos, would not have this defense. 
115 Id.
116 See Section C.3.b above. 
117 This does not appear to include the type of pre-screening that the Hendrickson court allowed. Cybernet, supra 
note 49, at 1181. 
118 Id. at 1181-82. 
119 Corbis, supra note 53, at 1110. 
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users is found to be instructive in holding that a right and ability to control existed. In addition, 
the Aimster service required members to logon, which allowed them to supervise the activities of 
the users. Aimster’s argument that the system’s encryption prevented them from blocking a 
user’s access without shutting down the entire service was rejected.120 The court again relied on 
Fonovisa as controlling precedent, where an ability to control was found for vicarious 
infringement when the company promoted, policed and controlled access of customers through 
its rules and regulations.121 
It is fairly clear that Aimster is inconsistent in the cases analyzing the §512(c) safe harbor. 
A court could choose to follow the absolute importation of vicarious liability precedent, although 
I doubt they will to such an extent as to make §512(c) internally inconsistent. Furthermore, 
YouTube is unlikely to lose the benefits of the safe harbor for prescreening and removal of sites 
obviously infringing copyright, consistent with their duty to not ignore red flags of infringement. 
The harder question is whether YouTube is found to control the content found on its website, as 
to amount to an issue like that in Cybernet. One commentator has expressed concern that 
exerting editorial control, like creating a “top 10” list or “editor’s picks,” could create an issue 
under this DMCA safe harbor.122 YouTube may have already run afoul, as they post “featured 
videos” on the home page.123 They have also setup “channels” for certain content providers. If 
YouTube provides advice to users who administer channels, a court could find that they had the 
right and ability to control. Lastly, since their Terms of Service state that YouTube retains a 
 
120 Aimster, supra note 66, at 654-55. 
121 Fonovisa, supra note 88, at 263. 
122 Amanda Bronstad, Video Web Sites Download a Defense, The National Law Journal (Nov. 2, 2006), at 
www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1162375515690. In its Answer to the Tur complaint, YouTube 
denied editing the content posted on its site. Tur Answer, supra note 14. 
123 It is unclear how “featured videos” are selected. It is at least speculated that the featured videos are not selected 
based on “metrics that involve user interest or ratings.” Rather, it is hypothesized that YouTube staff selects the 
Featured Videos and Director Videos featured on the right side of the page. “Some of the videos [are] actually just 
corporate marketing.” Richard Tur, ScrewTub  (Oct. 16, 2006), at www.richardtur.com/2006.10.16.shtml. Please 
note that the source may be biased, as Robert Tur is currently a plaintiff against YouTube. 
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license in the material, they could be said to have a certain level of control over the material, 
including the ability to reproduce, distribute and prepare derivative works of the submitted video. 
Whether having a license to control is synonymous with control is uncertain. These fact 
dependant questions could be integral to a court’s determination. 
5. Notification and Replacement of Disabled Material 
The elements of a proper notification of claimed infringement are laid out in 
§512(c)(3).124 YouTube’s Terms of Use strictly adheres to the statute. Following a proper 
notification, the service provider must expeditiously remove or disable access to the infringing 
material.125 “The purpose behind the notice requirement under the DMCA is to provide the 
internet service provider with adequate information to find and examine the allegedly infringing 
material expeditiously.”126 A notification must adhere “substantially” to the requirements. A 
written communication provided to the designated agent is necessary, and not part of the 
substantial adherence requirement.127 The two notification obligations that are most implicated 
with regards to substantial compliance are those dealing with identification of the infringing 
material.128 This question is extremely fact dependant and thus, will rely on the specifics of a 
copyright holders notice.129 
If the original poster chooses to file a substantially compliant counter-notification, 
pursuant to §512(g)(3), the service provider must supply notice to the provider of the initial 
 
124 The statute lists the requirements in 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi).  
125 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Some content holders do not believe that YouTube’s policies are satisfactory. 
Disney stated that “[i]t’s not efficient and [they] think there is a larger conversation to be had.” Eric Auchard, 
YouTube needs to do more on piracy, Disney exec says, Reuters (Nov. 29, 2006), available at 
http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/30112006/325/youtube-needs-piracy-disney-exec-says.html. 
126 CCBill, supra note 55, at 1087. 
127 Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1091. Strict adherence to these requirements is essential. 
128 “Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a 
single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 
512(c)(3)(A)(ii). “Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing 
activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to 
permit the service provider to locate the material.” 17 U.S.C.A.§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
129 See Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1089-92 for an example of how a court may deal with the notice requirement. 
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notification that the removed material will be replaced.130 Unless the provider of the notification 
informs the service provider of their filing an action to seek a court order to restrain the 
material’s restoration, the service provider must replace the material.131 If the service provider 
adheres to these requirements, they “shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the 
service provider’s good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to 
be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, 
regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing.”132 
Unsubstantiated claims of infringement could lead to liability for the filer of the notice.133 
D. Is YouTube An Infringer? 
 The safe harbor discussed above does not shield YouTube from being found guilty of 
infringement, under the theories of direct, vicarious and contributory liability. The DMCA 
statute is an affirmative defense that merely limits the relief available. If a court finds that 
YouTube is not liable for any of the above forms of copyright infringement, then the safe harbor 
under §512(c) is not necessary. YouTube is currently being sued by Robert Tur under each of 
these theories of liability, as well as the Grokster134 theory of inducement.135 A sampling of 
relevant precedents indicates that YouTube could be found liable of copyright infringement. 
Thus, the question of whether §512(c) is satisfied is crucial to its ability to operate. 
 1. Direct Infringement 
 
130 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2)(A)-(B). 
131 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
132 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(1).  
133 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(f). “Copyright owners should be cautious about making unsupported claims of infringement 
as false claims can lead to liability to anyone who suffers any damages because of a misrepresentation, including 
court costs and attorneys’ fees under Section 512(f). Thus, the copyright holder can become liable to YouTube or 
the poster for any damages that resulted from the improper removal of the material.” Hyman, supra note 22. 
134 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
135 Tur Complaint, supra note 14. 
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To establish a prima facie claim for direct infringement, the copyright holder must 
demonstrate that they own the material and that one of the exclusive rights provided under 17 
U.S.C.  §106 have been violated.136 YouTube’s users potentially violate all of these exclusive 
rights of copyrighted material when running its web service, but it is clear that they could be 
found to infringe the rights of reproduction and distribution, as Napster’s users were.137 
YouTube’s liability for direct infringement is improbable, however, based on the precedent set 
by CoStar.
The CoStar court held that “there should still be some element of volition or causation 
which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to use a copy by a third party,” 
although copyright is a strict liability statute.138 The court went on to state that “an ISP who owns 
an electronic facility that responds automatically to users’ input is not a direct infringer.”139 They 
are then acting more as conduits than copiers, as they have “no interest in the copy itself.”140 The 
question then becomes whether YouTube is truly passive. 
 
136 Napster, supra note 108, at 1013. The rights granted under 17 U.S.C. § 106 include ability to reproduce, prepare 
derivative works, distribute copies, perform publicly, display publicly and perform work publicly by means of a 
digital transmission. 
137 Id. at 1014. YouTube’s users could be protected under the Fair Use defense provided under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The 
factors considered by the court include “(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the ‘amount and substantiality of the portion used’ in relation to the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for the work or the value of the work.” Id., quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107. The analysis 
of the applicability of this defense is beyond the scope of this paper. If the court found that this defense was 
available to YouTube’s users (for example, if a lip-sync video of a copyrighted song was not found to be fair use), 
then YouTube would not be found liable of contributory or vicarious liability for posting such a video. At least one 
commentator believes that YouTube’s users have a good fair use defense, as the end user is engaging in a non-
commercial activity and most copyrighted material in user created videos do not have a licensing market. von 
Lohmann, supra note 6. 
138 CoStar Group Inc. v. LoppNet Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2004). 
139 Id. at 550.  
140 Id. at 551. LoopNet apparently did not have an interest in the copy of the infringing pictures, as they were not 
found guilty of direct infringement. The court never explicitly holds on this, leading one to believe that having an 
interest in the copy was mere dicta. If not, the court must have found that LoopNet’s interest in the infringing 
pictures used to advertise real estate listings was insufficient to find the company liable. It could be argued that 
LoopNet had an interest in such pictures, as the pictures themselves could act as a draw for customers. Unlike 
LoopNet, where the text of the listings is likely the primary attraction, YouTube’s videos are the basis of its 
business. It would be hard to argue that YouTube did not have an interest in the posted video content, as it is the 
principal allure for users. 
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The passivity of YouTube, at first glance, seems clear as YouTube does not pre-screen 
videos before they are posted. A pre-screening process does not in itself equate to non-passivity, 
as LoopNet’s process of briefly examining photographs that clearly infringed copyright did not 
create liability for LoopNet as a direct infringer in CoStar.141 The current lawsuits challenge 
whether services like YouTube are in fact passive, as “they are greatly involved in editing their 
content.”142 The creation of the featured video section, for example, could be considered 
“copying,” similar to that found in Hardenburgh.143 After encouraging users to upload files onto 
their system, Hardenburgh’s employees would transfer the files into folders available to 
subscribers. This was considered distribution by the court.144 YouTube could befall a similar fate 
if its employees are involved in the selection process of featured videos. This would be a factual 
question and at least calls to question whether YouTube would be deemed a direct infringer.145 
2. Vicarious Infringement 
 As discussed in Section C.4, YouTube is most in danger of being found liable for 
vicarious infringement of copyright. The vicariously liability conditions for users’ infringement 
are very similar (if not identical) to those §512(c)(1)(B). The party claiming infringement must 
establish that the service provider “derived a direct financial benefit and had the right and ability 
to supervise the infringing activity.”146 
a. Direct Financial Benefit 
 
141 Id. at 556. 
142 Bronstad, supra note 122. 
143 Hardenburgh, supra note 93. 
144 Id. at 513. 
145 Commentators have weighed in on whether YouTube could be held directly liable for infringement under the 
CoStar precedent. “[B]ecause its systems are largely automated, it may be that YouTube simply hasn’t engaged in 
the necessary ‘volitional act’ to cross into the realm of copyright infringement.” von Lohmann, supra note 6. “[T]he 
court held that an OSP that simply owns and manages a system used by others who are violating copyrights, and is 
not an actual duplicator itself, is not directly liable for copyright infringement. Thus, current case law likely requires 
a volitional act from YouTube to attach liability.” Hyman, supra note 22. 
146 Ellison, supra note 50, at 1078. 
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The Ellison court further narrowed the Fonovisa precedent for the direct financial benefit 
prong as applied to the digital world in Napster. “The essential aspect of the ‘direct financial 
benefit’ inquiry is whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any 
financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a 
defendant’s overall profits.”147 In this case, AOL was not found liable for hosting USENET 
groups where users transferred an author’s copyrighted novels. Insufficient evidence was 
presented that AOL’s “customers either subscribed because of the available infringing material 
or canceled subscriptions because it was no longer available.”148 The USENET groups were not 
found to be a draw that increased AOL’s userbase, but rather were an added benefit of the 
service.149 
The Cybernet court found that there was a strong likelihood of success that there was a 
direct financial benefit. Unlike Ellison, the content of the websites found in Cybernet’s network 
was the primary attraction for customers. “The more consumers appreciate the content of a page, 
the more money Cybernet receives,” as the user will only signup through their AdultCheck 
system if they are pleased by the pictures appearing on the member website.150 Unlike the Ellison 
court, where the copyright holder presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that the 
USENET groups acted as a draw, the Cybernet court placed this burden on the defendant: 
“Cybernet has given no reason to believe that these pages do not attract consumers, thereby 
creating a financial benefit to Cybernet.”151 
Most recently, and potentially most damaging to YouTube, the Google court found that a 
website that posts advertisements on websites exhibiting infringing images were directly 
 
147 Id. at 1079. 
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1172. 
151 Id. at 1173. 
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benefited under the theory of vicarious infringement. Google received a percentage of the 
advertising revenue derived from users of the infringing websites. Moreover, the infringing 
photographs found on the internet acted as at least a limited draw for Google Image Search, and 
the court found it “indisputable that Google does stand to benefit the more users visit and use 
Google Image Search.”152 In neither of these theories of direct financial benefit was firm 
evidence provided,153 demonstrating the broadness by which the court has interpreted this prong. 
 The progression and apparent liberalization of this prong established by these illustrative 
cases signifies the likelihood that YouTube will be found to receive a direct financial benefit 
from the infringing videos on its website. The infringing videos hosted on YouTube 
hypothetically act as a draw for customers, even if no definitive evidence is presented by a 
potential plaintiff that provides confirmation. Under the stricter Ellison standard, evidence could 
be provided that establishes that copyrighted videos have been among the most popular with 
users. However, as more content becomes licensed, the amount of illegal material found on 
YouTube continues to diminish, as does the drawing power of the remaining, improperly 
uploaded videos. Similar to Google, YouTube also relies on its ability to sell advertising space to 
collect revenue. If a banner advertisement is found alongside an infringing video, the necessary 
nexus of benefit would appear to be demonstrated. 
 b. Right and Ability to Supervise 
 Fonovisa provides the controlling precedent for this prong of the vicarious liability test. 
A third party has a right and ability to supervise the infringing activity when their rules and 
regulations provide for the power to promote and police the service, as well as control the access 
 
152 Google, supra note 107, at 857. 
153 Id.
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of customers.154 Napster applied this precedent to the digital realm and determined that Napster 
retained the right to control access to its system. The terms of service provided that Napster 
reserved the right to refuse access and terminate users at its discretion. “To escape imposition of 
vicarious liability, the reserved right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent,” which 
included monitoring the file name indices155 for copyrighted material.156 The court held that 
Napster failed to police its system, and thus held to satisfy this condition. YouTube’s liability 
will likely depend on this “closed system” standard.157 YouTube’s internal policy of searching 
tags would appear integral to a court holding, as their terms of service provide for controls 
similar to those endorsed by Napster.158 
3. Contributory Infringement 
 “[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory 
infringer.’”159 There is no contributory infringement for providing the means to infringe where 
the means to infringe is a staple article of commerce that is capable of substantial non-infringing 
use.160 This requires that a balance be struck between providing effective copyright protection 
 
154 Fonovisa, supra note 88, at 263. 
155 The file name indices are the means for which files on Napster were identified. These terms allowed for users to 
search the database of music stored on Napster’s system. 
156 Napster, supra note 108, at 1023-24. 
157 The Google court distinguished Google’s service from that of Napster, stating that “Napster did control the 
‘particular environment’ in which its file-sharing operated; its architecture was based on a proprietary, closed-
universe system, not an open, web-based service.” Google, supra note 107, at 857. In comparison, Google’s search 
service did not have the right and ability to control. “Google does not exercise control over the environment in 
which it operates—i.e., the web. Google’s ability to remove a link from its search index does not render the linked-
to site inaccessible.” Id.
158 Interestingly, the Google court applied the Hendrickson standard for the right and ability to control requirement 
of the DMCA safe harbor in coming to its conclusion. “[T]he ‘right and ability to control’…infringing 
activity…cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on its 
website or stored in its system.” Id. at 858. Google’s AdSense policy, which “reserved the right to monitor and 
terminate partnerships with entities that violate others’ copyright,” did not constitute a right and ability to control 
infringing activity. Because Google did not have the right to prevent the websites from posting infringing pictures, 
this requirement was not met. Id.. 
159 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).  
160 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 789-90 (1984). 
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and preserving the “rights of others to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”161 
YouTube’s function as a distribution channel for user-created and licensed works, otherwise 
lacking avenues for dissemination, will likely lead a court to rule that YouTube is not liable for 
contributory infringement under the staple of commerce doctrine. 
 a. Knowledge 
There is some disagreement in the courts as to the scope of the knowledge requirement. 
Generally, “contributory liability requires that the secondary infringer ‘know or have reason to 
know of direct infringement.’”162 The Napster court limited this precedent to actual knowledge 
in the online context. “Absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a 
computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the 
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”163 Napster was found to 
possess the specific information which identified the infringing activity, including a notification 
by the RIAA of more than 12,000 infringing files and a document written by the service’s 
founder about the need to remain “ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses.”164 While the 
users were eliminated from the servers, the songs were still available for download.165 In 
contrast, the Netcom166 court found that a disputed issue of fact as to knowledge existed where an 
online bulletin board was merely capable of infringing uses.167 
161 Id.
162 Napster, supra note 108, at 1020, quoting Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc. 902 F.2d 
829, 845 & 846 n. 29 (11th Cir. 1990). 
163 Id. at 1022. 
164 Id. at 1020 n. 5. The Cybernet court found that notification of generic potential copyright infringement by users 
should have alerted the defendant to infringing activities occurring on its member websites. Cybernet, supra note 49, 
at 1169. 
165 Napster, supra note 108, at 1022 n. 6. 
166 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc. 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
167 Napster, supra note 107, at 1021. 
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The Aimster II court rejected the 9th Circuit’s test, and provided that constructive 
knowledge is sufficient in cases where the secondary infringer exhibits willful blindness.168 The 
operator of a service cannot use “encryption software to prevent himself from learning what 
surely he strongly suspects to be the case: that the users of his service--maybe all the users of his 
service--are copyright infringers.”169 The court also held that it was insufficient for the service to 
only be physically capable of non-infringing uses. Absent evidence of actual non-infringing uses 
by the users of the service, a service can be found contributorily liable for infringement.170 “Even 
when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet file-sharing service, moreover, if the infringing 
uses are substantial, then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service 
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least 
reduce substantially the infringing uses.”171 
Under either of these standards, YouTube may be found to have knowledge of infringing 
uses. Content users have made multiple requests for videos to be removed from the service,172 
akin to the notice that the Napster court found sufficient to find Napster had actual knowledge. 
Additional evidence of knowledge could be established through the discovery process. Unlike 
Napster, YouTube appears to eradicate the files completely from their system, although it may be 
impossible to have a full-proof system of total abolition. YouTube may have difficulties claiming 
that they are merely aware of the possibility of infringement, but it is hard to imagine a court 
ruling that YouTube has been willfully blind to the issue of copyright infringement. As 
previously discussed, they are attempting to license content that would otherwise appear 
 
168 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Aimster II”). 
169 Id.
170 Id. at 652-53. This appears to directly challenge the precedent set in Sony.
171 Id. at 653. 
172 For example, 30,000 Japanese copyrighted videos were requested to be taken down, which YouTube promptly 
removed. The Associated Press, YouTube deletes 30,000 files after Japanese group complains about copyright 
infringement, International Herald Tribune (Oct. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/20/business/AS_TEC_Japan_YouTube_Copyrights.php. 
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illegally, as well as researching copyright identification technology. Finally, YouTube has many 
well established, non-infringing uses as have been discussed throughout this paper. The 
unavailability of other means of distribution would endanger these non-infringing purposes from 
occurring, especially in the context of user-created content. The combination of these factors will 
likely lead a court to rule that YouTube is not contributing to its users’ infringements. 
 b. Material Contribution 
“Providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish 
contributory liability.”173 To create a triable issue of fact for material contribution, it is only 
necessary that the service allow users to access copyrighted works.174 Napster was found to 
materially contribute to infringement by providing the site and facilities for direct infringement 
that enabled users to easily find and download music that would otherwise be difficult absent the 
service.175 This “but for” causation is likely to be damaging to YouTube, as they provide the 
servers and website that store and display videos posted by users. Absent YouTube (or similar 
services), users would not be able to share videos with the ease for which they are now 
accustomed. Therefore, a content holder will almost undeniably be able to present a prima facie 
case for material contribution. 
 4. Grokster Inducement 
 The Grokster theory of inducement is an additional theory of secondary liability. “[O]ne 
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by 
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting 
acts of infringement by third parties.”176 As a secondary infringer meeting this test would not 
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“compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise,” the Sony
substantial non-infringing use standard is not applicable in such cases.177 The court found three 
notable factors that proved Grokster had the unlawful intent to promote infringement: (1) the 
service was aimed to satisfy a known demand for infringement; (2) the service did not develop 
tools to lessen infringement on the service; and (3) the commercial viability of the service hinges 
on high volume use, which is infringing.178 The court states that in the absence of corroborating 
evidence, factors (2) or (3) would not alone establish a finding of unlawful intent.179 
Robert Tur’s lawsuit addresses each of these factors specifically. He first claims that 
YouTube “aimed to satisfy in part a known source of demand for copyright infringement, e.g., 
the market comprised of former Grokster video ‘sharers.’”180 Whether YouTube has internal 
documents suggesting an unlawful intent will be critical, but publicity for the service never 
claimed to be a replacement for a file sharing service previously shut-down.181 Next, Tur claims 
that YouTube “failed to develop any substantial filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish 
the infringing activity.”182 It is at least arguable that YouTube has created mechanisms to 
diminish infringing activity, by signing deals with content providers and creating a 
notice/takedown system that would remove copyrighted material from its website. YouTube is 
also creating software to help curb infringement. Finally, Tur claims that YouTube is pursuing a 
“model which rewards high-volume use, including that of infringing uses, with greater 
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179 Id. at 2781-82. 
180 Tur Complaint, supra note 14, ¶ 20. Commentators see this as an important point in determining liability. “If 
discovery in the Tur case turns up evidence that YouTube was banking on infringing material to increase 
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advertising revenue, as revenue is correlated with usage.”183 This factual question of infringing 
uses would require discovery. However, as it is probable that Tur will fail to verify YouTube’s 
intent to satisfy a known demand for illegally sharing copyrighted videos, I am skeptical that 
YouTube will be found liable for inducement.  
 
E. Conclusion 
 The outcomes of the legal and factual disputes discussed above will be integral to the 
future development of a service like YouTube. Video web hosting services have already proven 
to be exceptionally popular, and the potential for growth seems immense. If the courts find 
YouTube guilty of copyright infringement, either directly or under a theory of secondary 
liability, the availability of the DMCA safe harbor will be integral in allowing the service to 
develop on their current trajectory. Otherwise, an alteration of policies may be necessary to 
conform to the court’s interpretation of the statute’s qualifications. The implications of such 
potential changes, and whether they will allow YouTube to flourish and become a significant 
media channel, are yet to be seen. Remember, YouTube is still a fledgling company that has 
been in operation for roughly a year. Google obviously believes the future for video web hosting 
servers is bright, but the ever evolving digital world, with its demanding and erratic customer 
base, may not agree.  
 This is already apparent, as some users have voiced concerns about how YouTube may 
change after Google purchased the company. One YouTube poster commented that "[t]he Wild 
West feel of YouTube is already slipping away, and within a few weeks it likely will be gone 
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altogether.”184 The service’s popular creators may become annoyed by YouTube’s ability to 
profit from their content without any retribution, while more powerful content aggregators are 
sharing in advertising revenue. Their once loyal user base, which helped build the service, could 
flock to another video hosting service perceived to be less restrictive of their use.185 Will 
YouTube’s interest lie with these users or their new partners, the major movie studio, networks 
and record labels? Ironically, the deals that added legitimacy to YouTube’s business model may 
result in their losing the user base that made them the target of a $1.65 billion acquisition. The 
legal consequences, therefore, go beyond the possibility of copyright infringement liability. They 
may ultimately influence YouTube’s ability to become the “sixth network.” 
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